Forensic Analysis · Retail / Consumer Discretionary · as of Aug 5, 2026
Vroom, Inc. (VRM)
A forensic read on Vroom, Inc. built from its complete SEC filings — financial-health screens, earnings quality, red flags and a price-aware rating. Reproducible math, not opinion.
F · Poor — capital at risk
Forensic grade
Distress
Financial health
-5.0
Distress distance
Clean
Earnings quality
6
Forensic signals
-45.5%
ROE
-6.7%
Revenue growth
The financial-health reading above compares this company's equity at BOOK value, not at what the market currently pays for it — this free snapshot doesn't pull live market data. Treat it as a rough read, not the final word.
This free snapshot doesn't read filing or proxy text, so the auditor-quality and governance checks that can lower a grade were not evaluated (red flags, auditor quality, say on pay, board independence). Those checks only ever lower a grade, so the full analysis can land below the grade above but never above it — treat it as the most favourable reading, not the settled one.
Vroom, Inc. earns an F (Poor — capital at risk) forensic quality grade, and its Altman Z-score is -5.0, placing it in the Distress zone (based on book value, not market value, since this free snapshot doesn't pull live market data — treat this zone as a rough read, not the final word). 6 forensic signals were flagged in its latest SEC filings, led by return on invested capital.
What the filings flag
-7.6%
FY2025
Return on invested capital.Return on invested capital is -7.6% in the latest fiscal year and rising from -80% — well below its ~9% cost of capital, so reinvested dollars may be destroying value, not building it.
3% of rev
FY2025
Stock-based comp load.Stock-based compensation ran 3% of revenue and 8% of free cash flow in FY2025 — about $1.00 per diluted share. The cost of it is not in the cash flow — no cash left the business — it is in the count: holders gave up about 2.6% of the company a year, and that rate is not falling. That is the figure to weigh, not the share of free cash flow.
FCF ($367M)
FY2020
Shareholder returns.Returned $2M to shareholders (buybacks + dividends) in FY2020, but free cash flow was ($367M) after capex — there was no free cash flow to fund the payout from at all, and operating cash flow itself was negative or zero that year too. The entire return is coming from debt or cash reserves, not cash the business itself generated — a harder case than returns merely running ahead of free cash flow, since here there was none to run ahead of.
121d
FY2022→FY2023
Inventory days.Days inventory outstanding moved from 112 to 121 FY2022→FY2023 (against cost of goods sold; inventory -49% vs -57% in cost of sales). Inventory is building a little faster than sales — watch for markdowns.
n/m (stock split)
FY2022–FY2025
Share count (stock split).
Key fundamentals
Latest Revenue$157.5M
Revenue Growth YoY-6.7%
Net Margin-33.7%
Free Cash Flow$68.1M
Return on Equity-45.5%
Debt / Equity3.63x
Go deeper — free with an account
The forensic grade and screens above are free — no account needed. An account adds the full interactive deep-dive on Vroom, Inc.:
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🔒Calibrated 12-month price forecast, with the math shown
Data from SEC EDGAR public filings · metrics as of Aug 5, 2026. Forensic signals flag probability, not certainty.
Vroom, Inc. (VRM) Stock — Forensic Analysis, Red Flags & Rating | Stockonomy · Stockonomy
Diluted share count changed +201% over the last 3 years to FY2025, but that includes a large one-time change around FY2025 consistent with a stock split or reverse split, not gradual buybacks or issuance — a split changes the count with NO effect on any holder's proportional ownership, so the raw +44.3%/yr figure isn't a real buyback/dilution read here.
$202M
FY2022–FY2022
Goodwill impairments.Took $202M of goodwill writedowns across 1 year (FY2022 ($202M)). Writedowns mean past acquisitions underperformed what was paid for them.